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.
 I N TRODUCTION 
This declaratory judgment action has always centered on one 
issue: does the policy extend State Farm.' s owner's or operator's 
c o v e r a g e t: o C1 1 a d C h r i s t e n s e n ? 11 :J :i t: s 3: :i : :i • = f S t: a t: e • F a r n: i t: r i e s t: • : 
cloud the issue with arguments on standing and issue preservation. 
Yet; the fact remains., when a policy is not clear it must be 
i n t e r p r e t e d s t :i : :i c 13 ;; * a g a i n s t t h e :i i 1 s i 11: e i a i i ::i :i i ] f al: > c • r : f :: :: 1; r erage. 
Accordingly; the judgment for State Farm should be reversed, 
and judgment entered in favor of defendants.1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EGELSTON HAS STAMPING TO CHALLENGE STATE FARM'S 
INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTENSEN'S POLICY 
State Farm, sued Egelston in order to bind her to the declar-
ator \ ji ldg i: ii: tei it H : • ; \/e^ rer lie > i :i 1: assei: I::s 1::]: lat Egel ston d :: es • ' t 
have standing to argue constr uction of tl le policy. This is 
-State Farm maintains that Egelston has changed her position 
and is arguing that there are disputed issues of fact precluding 
summary judgment. That is inaccurate. Egelston argues that, 
because the policy is ambiguous and State Farm introduced no 
extrinsic evidence, the policy must be construed in favor of 
coverage. See Br. of Appellant, pp. 9-10. Of course, this Court 
has the discretion to decide that neither party is entitled to 
summary judgment even on cross-motions. See Amiacs Interwest, Inc. 
v. Design Assoc., 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981). 
1 
certainly an interesting position. Essentially, State Farm would 
have Egelston bound by the judgment but gagged to participate. 
A. Egelston Is A Proper Party. 
State Farm contends that Egelston is a proper party to this 
action. Yet, Utah law is clear. An injured victim is not a proper 
party to a declaratory judgment action by a liability insurer 
against its insured. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg, 315 P.2d 
277, 6 Utah 2d 399 (Utah 1957) . In support of its position, State 
Farm cites Justice Zimmerman's non-binding concurring opinion in 
Republic Ins. Group v. Doman, 774 P.2d 1130, 1131-32 (Utah App. 
1989) . There, Justice Zimmerman stated that to obtain the real 
benefit of a declaratory judgment action, the insurer should 
include the injured party. Id. However, that concurring opinion 
conflicts with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Chugg, which 
remains controlling. 
In Chugg, an insurer filed a declaratory judgment action 
against its insured and a third person injured by the insured. Id. 
at 4 01. As to such declaratory judgment actions, the Court stated: 
. . . we want to repel any inference which may 
be drawn from this opinion that one who claims 
to be damaged by the negligent act of another, 
is a proper party to an action by the insurer 
of the latter under a public liability policy, 
whereby a declaratory judgment is sought 
declaring the legal effect of the terms of 
such policy. 
• * * 
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The transaction involved in this action, is one 
between the insurer and insured, namely their 
contract. Such contract can be construed 
without reference to any liability having 
accrued thereunder. This being so, there is 
no issue of law or fact in common between the 
insurer and the plaintiff; or potential 
plaintiff, to a tort action against the 
insured. The tort victim has no present legal 
interest in the insurance contract. To drag 
him into the declaratory judgment action is to 
import into it a totally different contro-
versy, and to assert that there are issues of 
law or fact in common. 
Id. at. 4 06. 
Nevertheless, the Court decided Chugg i"'ii the merits. 
bpec i 11 c d i i y , M ne j i.i LIia i. ai L 11uuy11 111tj .i 11 j ui ed pe L son was not a 
proper party, he had not objected to being joined and was, thus, 
subject to thp jurisdiction nf the courts, The Court concluded: 
[I] i i this suit the trial court has juris-
diction of the subject matter and since Larsen 
failed to object to his joinder as a party in 
that suit and the issue was triable upon the 
appeal being taken, the issues were properly 
before us for review. 
Id. at 406. 
Hei e, Ege 1 s toi l 1 la s i ic«t obj ect ed t :: 1: • = • :i i l g j c • :i i leci T'i n LS t:he 
Court could proceed to determine her rights, just as the Chugg 
court determined the injured parties' rights. 
B, A Party Can Address Any Issue As To Which She Would Be Bound 
By The Result. 
Although State Farm agrees that Egelston i s enough of a. party 
to be boui id 1: ;  a judgment, ^  :i 1: wai its • t : • , = ilence 1: lei ai g umei its . 
Doing that would contravene the most basic concepts of fundamental 
fairness. A party cannot be bound by a judgment in the absence of 
having a full and fair opportunity to litigate. See, Salt Lake 
City v. Silver Fork Pipeline. 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995) . 
Indeed, the opportunity to be heard is an essential component of 
due process of law. See e.q., International Resources v. Dunfield, 
599 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1979). Thus, if Egelston is a party, she 
has the right to fully participate. Otherwise, this Court must 
conclude that Egelston is not a proper party and that the judgment 
must be vacated as to her. 
In a strikingly similar case, where the insurer also argued 
that a stranger to the contract could not contest its construction, 
the Michigan Supreme Court held: 
. . . Allstate named the injured party as an 
interested party in order to obtain a binding 
declaration regarding coverage. By initiating 
the declaratory judgment action and naming the 
injured persons as defendants, the insurance 
company should be deemed to have consented to 
a determination in that action of all matters 
that might be at issue between it and those 
persons arising from the controversy in 
question. By naming [the injured party] as an 
interested party, Allstate has consented to a 
determination of the coverage question. 
Allstate cannot complain about that determin-
ation on the basis of a lack of standing. 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Haves, 499 N.W.2d 743 (Mich. 1993) (citation 
omitted). 
Two federal courts have also said that it is anomalous to hold 
that an actual controversy exists between the insurer and injured 
4 
party, but deny the injured party's right to participate. See 
Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F 2 d 34 5 , 35 3 (3rd C i r. 
1986) (citii IQ Hawkeve-Security Ins.. Co. v Schulte, 302 F 2d 1 ; 1, 
177 (7th Cir. 1962)1 In Kemper, the court quoted Hawkeve-Security 
and held: 
Appellee [ti le ii lsurance company]
 voiuntarily 
brought the appellant [the injured party] into 
this litigation as a party defendant. [The 
injured party] being a proper party to an 
actual controversy with [the insurance com-
pany] , should be heard to assert any proper 
defense raised by his answer to the complaint. 
(Emphasis added.) Kemper at 177; Hawkeve at 
353 . 
The Colorado Supreme Court has recerr" y stated: 
j t w a s therefore proper for [zne insurer] to 
name [the injured party] as a party defendant 
and, once joined, [the injured party] may 
fully participate in. the action (Emphasis 
added.) 
• • 
Hence, we conclude that allegedly-
injured party in the underlying action may 
defend an anticipatory judgment as long as the 
action is properly initiated by a party with a 
legally cognizable claim. 
Constitution Assoc, v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 93 0 P.2d 55 6, 562 
(Colo. 1997). 
State Farm makes the equally interesting argument that 
Ege1ston cannot question i ts construction o£ the po 1 icy because 
" [i i] e i t h e r the insurer [State Farm.] nor tl HE insured [Christensen] 
have raised issue as to the terms of the insurance contract " Br. 
5 
of Appellee, p. 4. State Farm notes that Christensen "has allowed 
judgment to be taken against him, without opposition and with 
appeal." Id. 
If anything, Christensen's passivity compels, rather than 
precludes, having Egelston argue in favor of coverage. If the 
insured lies down and the injured party is gagged, there is not 
much of an adjudicable controversy. Indeed, in circumstances such 
as these, where the insured refuses to take a position, the court 
should be very cautious about granting summary judgment for the 
insurer because of the real potential for collusion between insured 
and insurer.2 Although it is not clear whether Egelston is a 
proper party, State Farm's position is in error. Either the 
injured person is a proper party or they are not. If they are 
proper, they can raise any valid defense. If not, summary judgment 
cannot be entered against her. 
POINT II 
THE ISSUE TO BE DECIDED IN THIS CASE WAS 
PROPERLY RESERVED BELOW 
State Farm argues that "[t]he issue of ambiguity was not 
raised in the trial court, and cannot be raised for the first time 
on appeal." The issue here has always been construing the policy--
2Christensen's attorney, here, has been provided by State 
Farm. One must wonder why Christensen did not just stipulate to 
State Farm's interpretation. Then again, perhaps, that would have 
been going too far. 
6 
specifically, whether the insurance contract was an "owner's" 
policy or an "operator's policy" (or, both or neither) . This issue 
was preserved and acknowledged by the trial court judge: 
THE COURT: . . . The issue before the 
Court is whether or not the 
policy in question is either an 
owner's policy or an operator's 
policy pursuant to the 
definitions or the guidelines 
set forth in the statute as 
well as case law. 
(March 5, 1997 Transcript at p. 4.) 
Ambiguity is simply one of many rules of construction which 
might be utilized to answer the core issue described by the judge 
above. See U.S. Fidelity and Guarantee Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 
521 & 523 (Utah 1993) (liability turns upon the policy language and 
"the rules of construction that apply to insurance policies. . . . 
[I]f an ambiguity arises, the rules of construction outlined above 
must be employed"). 
Additionally, although the word "ambiguity" was not specifi-
cally used in the trial court, the parties argued at length about 
the unclear nature of State Farm's policy and the application of 
the rules of construction (March 5, 1997 Transcript of pp. 10-15). 
As Egelston's attorney stated: 
The initial problems that we face is one of 
the statutes not defining what an owner's or 
operator's policy is, and also the fact that 
the policy itself does not define itself as an 
owner's policy. So we're left with looking at 
7 
the content of both the policy and of the law 
to determine what it is. 
(R. 231-236.) 
At most, Egelston is simply presenting a more specific and 
better-supported argument as to the issue, which was squarely 
presented and decided below. That is not the same as presenting a 
new issue. It is not inappropriate (and sometimes is advisable) 
for an appellant to refocus arguments and change emphasis on 
appeal. That is all that has been done here. 
Even if "ambiguity" was a new issue (which it is not), this 
Court has discretion to consider it. See Colorado Interstate v. 
Cit. Group/Equipment Fin., 993 F.2d 743, 751 (10th Cir. 1993). 
("the matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the 
first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the 
court of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual 
cases"). Although the district court had not had the benefit of 
argument on the issue of whether a contractual provision was an 
unenforceable penalty, the appellate court exercised its discretion 
and considered the issue because it was an issue of law. See 
Colorado Interstate supra. See also Stahmann Farms. Inc. v. U.S., 
624 F.2d 958, 961 (1980) (new issue may be heard where the question 
is one of law and the failure to hear it results in the miscarriage 
of justice). 
8 
In Utah, questions of contract interpretation are a matter of 
law if they do not require extrinsic evidence. Valley Bank and 
Trust Co. v. U.S. Life Title Insurance Co. of Dallas, 776 P.2d 933, 
935 (Utah App. 1989) . Here, as Egelston has already noted, State 
Farm failed to offer extrinsic evidence. Moreover, every summary 
judgment is reviewed for correctness as a matter of law. See 
Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991) . Thus, even if 
the court considered ambiguity a new issue, it has the power to 
consider it. 
POINT III 
STATE FARM FAILS TO ADDRESS THE POINTS MADE BY EGELSTON 
State Farm's arguments rely primarily upon a statement made by 
Egelston's counsel below, agreeing "that the policy excludes 
coverage for motorcycles in the language. . . . " See Br. of 
Appellee, p. 2 (citing R. 232-33) (emphasis added). This is not, 
as State Farm contends, an admission as to the effect to be 
accorded to this language. Rather, it is an acknowledgement that, 
if one follows the painstaking definitional trail laid down by 
State Farm, one arrives at language excluding motorcycles. 
Egelston's brief on appeal acknowledges the very same thing. 
Moreover, Egelston's counsel below further stated, "and the issue 
is, does the law allow that when it comes to an operator." Id. 
The real point here, is that this exclusion must have been clear to 
9 
the insured when the policy was issued. The fact that trained 
professionals -- including the injured party's attorney -- can 
attempt to decipher the policy after-the-fact is irrelevant. See 
Sandt, 854 P.2d at 523-25; see also Loya v. State Farm Mut. Ins. 
Co., 888 P.2d 447, 451 (N.M. 1994). 
State Farm fails to explain how an average, reasonable insured 
was to have understood this exclusion. Instead, it argues that a 
"motorcycle" is not a "car" as a matter of law (although it is a 
"motor vehicle"). See Br. of Appellee, p. 10 (citing Bear River 
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wright, 880 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1989). This 
proves too much because a motorcycle is a "car" under State Farm's 
policy for some purposes (i.e., if it is owned by the insureds). 
The ambiguity arises from switching back and forth depending upon 
which adjective appears in conjunction with the term "car." See 
Br. of Appellant, pp. 11-13. State Farm offers no justification 
for this confusing use of terminology. It offers no explanation 
for how a policy can clearly provide different types of coverage 
with respect to motorcycles, but never expressly mention the term 
"motorcycle." 
State Farm also argues that the law "makes a distinction 
between . . . an 'owner's policy' and an 'operator's policy'." Br. 
of Appellee, p. 11. Unfortunately, State Farm's policy does not 
make such a distinction. Moreover, the law does not require that 
a policy provide only one type of coverage; but, that it must 
10 
provide at least one type. Thus, the fact that the policy provides 
"owner" coverage does not exclude "operator" coverage. State Farm 
does not even address the point that the policy does not provide 
full "owner's" coverage for permissive users. See Br. of 
Appellant, p. 15.3 
Most important, State Farm offers no explanation as to why it 
could not have just said, straight-away, "this is an owner's pol-
icy" or "this is not an operator's policy," and "that means. . ." 
State Farm's final argument is that the law allows it to 
provide "additional coverage." Again, that is true, but (again) 
what the law allows and what the policy at issue says are not 
necessarily the same thing. How is a reasonable layperson to know 
which is the "primary" coverage and which is the "additional" 
coverage -- particularly when the so-called "additional coverage 
(for non-owned cars) comes first in the policy? See Br. of 
Appellant, pp. 14-15. The policy does not specifically designate 
different coverages as "primary" or "additional." 
That is the fatal flaw in State Farm's policy. It could have 
easily expressed the exclusion upon which it relies in clear and 
understandable terms. In fact, Sandt requires it. It could have 
3Surely this exclusion is as fatal to owner's coverage as the 
exclusion for using someone else's motor vehicle as a "dwelling" is 
fatal to operator's coverage. See Br. of Appellee, p. 13. 
Egelston will certainly agree that this policy fails to clearly 
provide either type of required coverage in full. 
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said "this is an owner's policy" and "this is your primary 
coverage." It could have said "this is additional coverage" and 
"your additional coverage does not apply to motorcycles." The 
fatal flaw in State Farm's argument is that it fails to explain why 
it chose the confusing language used in the policy or how a 
layperson is to comprehend it. 
State Farm is correct about one thing -- a contract is not 
ambiguous simply because the parties disagree as to what it means. 
This is an objective inquiry, based upon how an average, reasonable 
insured would understand the policy. See Sandt, 854 P.2d at 523-
25. The logical correlary is that a policy is not unambiguous just 
because the insured and insurer appear to agree as to its meaning. 
Here, that agreement between insurer and insured can only be 
inferred from Christensen's passivity in this litigation. Perhaps, 
that is the most intriguing unanswered question -- if Christensen 
knew and understood that a non-owned motorcycle was not covered, 
why did State Farm need to sue him? At the very least, why has he 
not stipulated to that fact or signed an affidavit for purposes of 
the summary judgment? And, if he does disagree with State Farm, 
why is he standing mute while his coverage disappears? 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly, Egelston is either "in" or "out." Either she can 
address the issue of construing the policy (which was presented 
12 
below) or she must be dismissed from the action without prejudice. 
On the merits, it is apparent that the policy did not follow the 
Utah Supreme Court's mandate in Sandt by being clear and 
unambiguous. Thus, the summary judgment must be reversed. 
DATED this ^ day of f-£ \&£Uc CKs/LA , 1998 
ROBERT J. DEBRY SKASSOCIATES 
Attorneys f or>pai:endant/Appellant 
j . BWDFORD^DEBRY 
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